Analysis of rapid acquisition processes to fulfill future urgent needs by Arellano, Robert L. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-12
Analysis of rapid acquisition processes to fulfill future
urgent needs
Arellano, Robert L.











JOINT APPLIED PROJECT 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RAPID ACQUISITION 






By:  Robert L. Arellano,  
 Ryan G. Pringle, and 
 Kelly L. Sowell 
 
Advisors: Ray Jones 
 Charles K. Pickar 




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-
0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
December 2015
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES
COVERED 
Joint Applied Project 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
ANALYSIS OF RAPID ACQUISITION PROCESSES TO FULFILL FUTURE 
URGENT NEEDS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robert L. Arellano, Ryan G. Pringle, Kelly L. Sowell
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     




    AGENCY REPORT 
NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The objective of this project is to analyze rapid acquisition processes in order to evaluate the current 
organization, structure and regulations within the Department of Defense (DOD). This analysis helps 
determine if the rapid acquisition process used for two programs is repeatable for future endeavors. 
Additional analysis of identified DOD regulations and organizations shows how the rapid acquisition 
process expedited these systems and how it benefited the warfighter. The project reviews statutory and 
regulatory requirements covering the rapid acquisition process in the DOD and compares current DOD 
processes and the effects of their implementation. The project also reviews the warfighters’ actions when 
DOD entities do not address critical needs within reasonable timelines. The analysis results indicate that 
the current DOD organization and regulations do not provide an effective means for future rapid 
acquisition requirements, do not effectively promote the agility needed for rapid acquisition, and actually 
encumber the rapid acquisition process.   
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ANALYSIS OF RAPID ACQUISITION PROCESSES TO FULFILL 
FUTURE URGENT NEEDS 
Robert L. Arellano, Civilian, Department of Army 
Ryan G. Pringle, Civilian, Department of Army 
Kelly L. Sowell, Civilian, Department of Army 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2015
Authors: Robert L. Arellano 
Ryan G. Pringle 
Kelly L. Sowell 
Approved by: Ray Jones 
Charles K. Pickar, Ph.D. 
Brad Naegle, Academic Associate  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ANALYSIS OF RAPID ACQUISITION PROCESSES TO FULFILL 
FUTURE URGENT NEEDS 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this project is to analyze rapid acquisition processes in order to 
evaluate the current organization, structure and regulations within the Department of 
Defense (DOD). This analysis helps determine if the rapid acquisition process used for 
two programs is repeatable for future endeavors. Additional analysis of identified DOD 
regulations and organizations shows how the rapid acquisition process expedited 
these systems and how it benefited the warfighter. The project reviews statutory and 
regulatory requirements covering the rapid acquisition process in the DOD and 
compares current DOD processes and the effects of their implementation. The project 
also reviews the warfighters’ actions when DOD entities do not address critical needs 
within reasonable timelines. The analysis results indicate that the current DOD 
organization and regulations do not provide an effective means for future rapid 
acquisition requirements, do not effectively promote the agility needed for rapid 
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This project conducted an analysis of the rapid acquisition processes for the 
purposes of evaluating the current organization, structure and regulations within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to understand if the rapid acquisition process used for two 
rapid acquisition programs is repeatable for future endeavors. The project examined the 
outputs of two programs that are most identified with rapid acquisition, the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs.   
Research analyzed these two programs against the objectives of DOD 
organizations such as the Rapid Equipping Force, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO), and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). Analysis of 
identified DOD organizations and the two programs together with the analysis of DOD 
regulations will show how the rapid acquisition process expedited these systems and what 
the benefits to the warfighter were. The evaluated DOD documents included Department 
of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (DODI 5000.02), Army Regulation 70-1 (AR 70-1), 
Department of Army Pamphlet 70-3 (DA PAM 70-3) and Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Memorandum: Use of Secretary of Defense’s 
Rapid Acquisition Authority.   
Findings from this research indicate that DOD key leader involvement is essential 
to a successful rapid acquisition process. Findings also indicate that the organizations 
such as the JRAC and JIEDDO contribute greatly to processing requirements and set the 
stage for rapid acquisition to occur, but only if they can maintain the same abilities 
demonstrated during the earlier years of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. Research also 
found that organizations that have some autonomy and control over funding, contracting 
priority and use of waivers make the procurement actions needed for rapid acquisition 
possible. Without senior leaders enabling those critical functions, organizations are 
limited in their abilities to quickly and efficiently acquire and field capabilities to the 
warfighter, resulting in individual attempts to procure critical needs through 
unconventional methods. The final finding focuses squarely on fielding requirements to 
 xiv 
the warfighter. Without a process that is motivated on fielding requirements quickly to 
the warfighter, the benefits from rapid acquisition are quickly lost.    
The results from the analysis and the findings point toward a DOD organization 
supported by regulations that do not provide an effective means for future rapid 
acquisition requirements. In addition, leadership changes do not effectively promote the 
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A. THE FUTURE CAPABILITY OF RAPID ACQUISITION  
During the years supporting warfighter missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Department of Defense (DOD) organizations and acquisition program offices used rapid 
acquisition as a means to quickly acquire and field capabilities. Critics viewed the 
derived rapid acquisition process with some skepticism; as a means of supporting 
warfighter needs, however, senior DOD leadership and others generally agreed that rapid 
acquisition was successful and meaningful. As a means to preserve that capability, DOD 
leadership has reorganized certain rapid acquisition groups and revised DOD regulations. 
The acquisition program offices involved in rapid acquisition have transitioned, 
reorganized and downsized to meet the needs of a more traditional program set-up. As 
the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have diminished, the need for rapid acquisition has 
also diminished. As the DOD continues to reorganize and reshape its capabilities, can it 
maintain a rapid acquisition ability and successfully meet the future urgent needs of the 
warfighter? 
B. SCOPE 
This research identifies elements that made rapid acquisition a successful 
possibility during the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. These elements should be present in 
the current DOD organization with enough rigor to meet any future urgent requirement 
without the need of added legislation or added regulation. Through a study of DOD 
organizations, regulations and policies, the research focuses on past versions of certain 
organizations, regulations and policies, and notes changes that are in place on the most 
recent versions and whether those changes facilitate or hinder a rapid acquisition process. 
The study also analyzes rapid acquisition programs and how those programs worked in 
the past within the framework devised by senior DOD leadership.   
The scope of the research is contained within certain DOD organizations, 
regulations and acquisition programs. For the organizational aspect, research focused on 
DOD entities that facilitate rapid acquisition as a core mission function. The 
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organizations for this paper were limited to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC), Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), Rapid Equipping Force (REF), Rapid 
Fielding Initiative (RFI), Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
(JIEDDO), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) agencies. 
These organizations have provided a foundation for the most recent rapid acquisition 
efforts and they will more than likely be the foundation in any future attempts in rapid 
acquisition programs. Policy research focused on regulations that include rapid 
acquisition as part of their contents.   
For acquisition programs, this paper reviews two of the largest rapid acquisition 
programs for the DOD during the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, the Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs. The two 
selected programs were large in scale and key leaders within the DOD noted these two 
programs as representative of the rapid acquisition process. As such, these two programs 
had more readily available information that facilitated research. 
C. BACKGROUND 
According to logistics management specialist Jim Farmer, “Rapid acquisition is 
defined as the procurement of critical military capabilities in support of current 
operations, where those capabilities cannot be provided through standard ‘traditional’ 
acquisition” (2012, p.46). More traditional acquisition programs proceed from the 
requirements phase through the actual procurement and fielding of the capability, which 
can take up to 12 years or longer (Farmer, 2012). Most acquisition programs do not tie 
themselves to an actual wartime effort and simply proceed at a pace that is more calendar 
driven rather than event driven. The calendar-driven pace contributes to the perception 
that the warfighter has what he needs to accomplish his mission. Rapid acquisition, on the 
other hand, takes a critical current need and translates that into an immediate procurement 
action that focuses explicitly on the needs of the warfighter and how best to serve him. 
Both processes provide capability to the warfighter. The more traditional approach is 
meant more to identify future requirements and slowly, but steadily, works toward 
procuring and fielding those requirements. If that happens to coincide with a major 
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wartime engagement, so much the better for the warfighter. Rapid acquisition, as the 
name implies, is immediate in nature. Rapid acquisition does not follow a traditional 
timeline and seeks to field some measure of capability to the warfighter in as short a time 
as possible. 
Due to the advances in technology, battlefield tactics and the availability of 
advanced weaponry for its adversaries, the U.S. military faces new battlefield threats and 
scenarios that have identified a need for faster alternatives to the traditional acquisition 
process. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 75 percent of the casualties were from improvised 
explosive devices (IED) (Sullivan, 2008). In an effort to combat these challenges, the 
DOD looked to a rapid acquisition process that focused on providing our military the 
equipment needed outside the scope of the standard acquisition process (Gates, 2014). 
Rapid acquisition’s focus is on delivering a supportable capability to the warfighter that 
fills a critical need as quickly as possible. Acquisition program offices can perform a 
rapid acquisition process in as little as four months, as seen with the MRAP, or up to two 
years, which is the maximum allotted timeframe, with a 75 percent solution to the 
requirement as the objective (Farmer, 2012). The standard acquisition process can take 
from 12–25 years before a functional system is in the hands of the users (Farmer, 2012). 
During the last decade, the development of several high-profile rapid acquisition systems 
validated the need to incorporate standard guidance for rapid acquisition into DOD 
regulations and institutionalize organizational elements that facilitate the process. The 
MRAP family of vehicles and the UAV are two examples of large-scale rapid acquisition 
processes. 
In 2002, the U.S. Army was engaged in battlefield operations in Afghanistan for 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the following year, 2003, the United States 
entered into Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Whaley, 2014). Over the next few 
years, from 2003–2007, capability gaps occurred that required the defense acquisition 
community to engage in a rapid acquisition process not seen since the Second World War 
(WWII). While the process evolved from 2007–2012, the basic intent to rapidly procure 
and field capabilities to the warfighter remained relatively unchanged. No uniform 
process was in place to cover urgent-need fulfillment at the pace needed and on the scale 
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seen during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The prevailing understanding was that 
whatever it took to get the piece of equipment into the warfighter’s hands is what the 
acquisition community would go to great lengths to perform (JPO MRAP, 2008–2011). 
From 2012 to the present, elements within the acquisition, community remained engaged, 
with the rapidly fielded systems continuing to not only deliver support to the warfighter, 
but also to push their related systems through the materiel release process and turn their 
systems into programs of record. The services did not fully integrate the fielded systems 
into a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), which complicated the 
materiel release and program of record process. The bulk of the Army’s enduring MRAP 
fleet is heading for fielding to Army Prepositioned Stock locations, and the systems are 
still in use in Afghanistan. As MRAP vehicles provide better protection from IEDs than 
other vehicles, like the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or the 
basic Army 5-ton truck, for troop movement and convoy operations there remains a 
strong possibility that MRAP vehicles will fill future operational needs. In spite of the 
current and future needs of MRAP vehicles, no single MRAP platform has attained a Full 
Materiel Release.1 
For the time period from 2007–2012, the MRAP and UAV acquisition 
communities relied on the JROC, JIEDDO, REF, RFI, and the JRAC organizations to 
provide direction on requirements and to quickly vet operational needs statements (ONS) 
and joint urgent operational needs statements (JUONS). Additionally, individual 
procurement and DARPA’s refocused efforts post-September 11, 2001 were two methods 
used to offset the lag between the urgent need approval processes and equipping units. 
Continuous senior leadership involvement proved advantageous to MRAP and UAV 
rapid acquisition programs. Decisions for more traditional programs that could take 
months to achieve would take mere days for the MRAP and UAV rapid acquisition 
programs. Decisions such as designating MRAP a DX-rated (Manufacturing and 
                                                 
1 See AR 700-142 for Materiel Release requirements, there are over 40 documented requirements for 
Full Materiel Release, most of which are sustainment related. 
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Industrial Base Policy, 2011) program2 and reprogramming $5.4 billion to immediately 
put on contract in 2007 pushed the MRAP program into the top three major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs) behind only missile defense and the Joint Strike Fighter. 
These two decisions allowed the MRAP program to move to the head of the line for 
priority of contracting actions and were only possible with this level of oversight (Carter, 
2014). 
From 2012 to the present, the sense of urgency for fielding MRAPs and flying 
UAV missions has substantially decreased. With the reduction of forces in Afghanistan 
and the almost complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq prior to 2015, there simply has 
not been the volume of urgent needs to substantiate continuing MRAP under rapid 
acquisition authority. In the case of MRAPs no new fielding requirement has been 
initiated since September 2012 with the last vehicle upgrades shipped into Afghanistan 
and completed in the last quarter of FY13 (JPO MRAP, 2012). The JROC, JIEDDO, 
REF, RFI and JRAC organizations are still in place but the pace of ONS and JUONS in 
the early part of 2015 has diminished to almost completely nothing. The direct access to 
the senior leadership from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA(ALT)) organizations has evaporated and while MRAP has a strong 
budget it still only receives overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding. The Army 
MRAP program office did not request OCO funding beyond FY17 and to date has not 
initiated any actions to pursue future funding beyond FY17. 
This analysis of these rapid acquisition organizations and policies are important. 
The study of the DOD structure and organization is important if the DOD wants to retain 
the gains from the most recent rapid acquisition programs and translate that effort into 
saving warfighter lives and covering capability gaps. The acquisition community should 
meet the next engagement with its own capability to meet urgent warfighter needs with 
                                                 
2 Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS)—DX is the highest priority rating placing that 
program’s contracts and parts orders ahead of other programs that do not carry that rating (Manufacturing 
and Industrial Base Policy, 2011).  
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potentially life-saving equipment. Without this study, the potential exists that these rapid 
acquisition processes will be lost and the DOD will simply go back to business as usual. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
As a lens through which to review these regulations and policies, this research 
shows how the MRAP and UAV programs might have benefitted or been hindered from 
the changes. Research identifies the changes in regulatory, procurement and engineering 
processes that could have made past acquisitions easier and could make future rapid 
acquisition more effective and efficient. 
Through research of the MRAP and UAV acquisition programs with focus 
oriented on the rapid acquisition process, the study determines if retaining a rapid 
acquisition process separate from the more traditional process is possible. This question 
focuses more on keeping the functionality to rapidly acquire and field capabilities for the 
warfighter. In stepping through the histories of the MRAP and UAV programs and their 
relationships with DOD leadership, the impact from DOD organizations and changes in 
subsequent organizations and regulations, research shows that having a separate rapid 
acquisition process can provide capability to the warfighter faster than a more traditional 
program. Given the special circumstances that delivered the MRAP and UAV capabilities 
to the warfighter, evidence will show that it will take another unconventional war or a 
never before perceived capability gap coupled with an urgent need to jump start the rapid 
acquisition process again. 
As events in the world continue to evolve, the SecDef, OSD, ASA(ALT), JROC, 
JRAC, JIEDDO, RFI, and REF organizations continue to update their processes to meet 
the future demands of what might be the next rapid acquisition program. Research will 
review these organizations and whether or not there remains enough of a mission to 
continue their efforts and if there is a process in place to meet future urgent needs. As the 
formations of JIEDDO, JRAC, RFI and REF organizations were similar to an integrated 
product team (IPT), without a requirement or urgent need to fuel their efforts research 
will indicate that these organizations could focus their attentions elsewhere and divert 
resources to other purposes.  
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As regulations, policies, committees and organizations remain in their current 
states, research in these areas will indicate that the rapid acquisition gains from the 
MRAP and UAV programs may not be repeatable. As emerging urgent needs continue to 
from combatant commands, the study of organizations and regulations and how the DOD 
translates those urgent needs into rapid acquisition requirements could indicate that the 
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II. LITERATURE AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW 
A. URGENT NEED PROCUREMENT METHODS, THE WARFIGHTER 
AND THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAPID EQUIPPING 
FORCE  
During recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, units, as well as individual 
warfighters, bought after-market flash suppressors, muzzle covers, magazines, 
commercial body armor and clothing (Cerre, n.d.). These acquisition efforts were well 
intended and meant to supplement or complement the performance of the equipment at 
hand or to gain some increased level of protection that was not readily available through 
the supply system (“Soldiers in Iraq,” 2015). On the extreme side, some National Guard 
members rummaged through landfills and scrapyards looking for bulletproof glass and 
metal plates to make improvised armor improvements or “Hillbilly Armor” for their High 
Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) (Schmitt, 2004) (see Appendix B for 
examples of self-procured equipment). When then-Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld responded to a question from a concerned soldier with, “You go to war with 
the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time” (Schmitt, 
2004, Para. 2) he provided a clear indication of why some service members elected to 
purchase or make their own gear. The United States Army and Marine Corps recently 
banned the use of some gear used during recent conflicts essentially cutting off this 
potential for buying added or increased performance for the individual warfighter. 
Another reason that warfighters had to acquire gear in this manner was due to the 
lengthy timelines involved and supply shortages. In preparing for overseas deployments, 
U.S. forces took it upon themselves to procure protective gear for personal use and to 
upgrade their equipment. Rather than wait on a lengthy process for acquiring adequate 
gear, the warfighter simply improvised and came up with his own solution. The following 
examples, such as the use of remote control model cars, improvised armor and the 
purchase of Dragon Skin, expresses some of the urgency that U.S. forces had regarding 
the lack of protective gear or specialized equipment (Baglole, n.d.; Cerre, n.d.; “Soldiers 
in Iraq,” 2015; Stump, 2015). While units were conducting combat missions, they fell 
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prey to multiple threats from enemy forces and terrorists. Effective countermeasures, 
through either equipment or tactics, were not available or in place due to the 
unconventional methods used against U.S. forces. The extensive approval process 
required for any requested urgent need was simply too long to be effective against these 
emerging threats. The threats to U.S. forces in those early years coupled with the lengthy 
urgent needs process simply forced the warfighter to choose between sticking with the 
ineffective gear issued or procuring a perceived safer and more reliable piece of 
equipment. Some individuals even created their own weapon modifications and vehicle 
armor to supplement the delay in receiving new gear and equipment (Baglole, n.d.). For 
the individual who deployed for six to twelve months, any delay was unacceptable.    
Prior to 2013 and the inclusion of Enclosure 13 in DODI 5000.02, the Army did 
not have a formal acquisition strategy in place to fill critical battlefield requirements.3 
Commands used several different methods to field urgent equipment to its warfighters.  
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) created the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 
in 2002 and used current and emerging technologies to meet urgent challenges for 
deployed forces (“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d.).  
The VCSA authorized the formation of a Robotic Tiger Team, known 
as the Rapid Integration of Robot Systems (RIRS) to find a robot that 
addressed the shortfall of cave clearing and place it into theater quickly 
…. In September 2002, the Tiger Team partnered with the DARPA and 
industry partner’s, and in less than 30 days, procured the PackBot, the 
Marcbot and the M7 operator controller unit (OCU) and subsequently 
deployed them to Afghanistan. (“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d., Para. 3)  
The success of this joint effort led to the establishment of the REF, which 
provided several critical contributions to the battlefield. These achievements include the 
Live Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Link, a commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) radio receiver used to receive communications from multiple UAVs, and 
the Containerized Weapon System, an unmanned weapon system controlled from a 
central control station similar to UAVs (“Rapid Equipping Force,” 2015). The REF is 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A. DODI 5000.02 enclosure 13 comparison.   
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currently active but the program is now under Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC).  
B. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY 
INVOLVEMENT SUPPORTING URGENT NEEDS OF THE 
BATTLEFIELD 
Post September 11, 2001, directives from then Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld ended DARPA’s focus on dual use or generic technologies. DARPA’s new 
focus was military research, which ironically happened to be its original function 
(Thompson, 2013). DARPA’s unique ability to operate outside the confines of 
bureaucracy and its ability to pool resources outside of normal research and development 
fields proved valuable in addressing urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan (Thompson, 
2013)  DARPA provided immediate solutions to several battlefield challenges that could 
not have been resolved through the normal processes. DARPA created the Adapted 
Execution Office (AEO) in order to accelerate its technology’s into usable capabilities on 
the battlefield (Thompson, 2013). The AEO Leverages DARPAs unique organization and 
skill sets to increase progress on projects that have a critical impact on the battlefield 
(Thompson, 2013).   
Some of these efforts include increasing the robotics program with the assistance 
of non-traditional roboticists. This effort fast tracks the robotics program in an effort to 
find quicker solutions for immediate problems. DARPA also inspired a program to host a 
site that invites “non-traditional roboticists to help bolster national security” (DARPA, 
2015, p. 1). DARPA changed the formulation of battlefield strategies by improving UAV 
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and devising new methods to eliminate high 
profile targets through drone attacks. Senior leadership within the DOD was able to 
combine DARPA’s ability to quickly develop these game changing capabilities with the 
REF’s capability to deliver critical equipment to the warfighter and was used extensively 
from 2001–2010. The success of this effort was an increase in UAV missions, and 
subsequent successful mission accomplishments, on the battlefield through this 
timeframe. 
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While the SecDef had to change DARPA’s focus, as an organization it was able 
to quickly provide solutions utilizing unique technologies and continues to provide 
results for warfighter’s needs today. In its ability to adapt quickly and change focus, 
DARPA has a potential weakness. Should senior leadership be less capable or less 
willing to change DARPA’s focus to meet urgent needs the warfighter could potentially 
be cut off from a valuable solution generating organization. 
C. THE RAPID EQUIPPING FORCE IN GREATER DETAIL AND THE 
RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE 
In 2002, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army was looking for a way to reduce 
casualties from booby traps and grenade blowback as Soldiers cleared and searched caves 
in Afghanistan (“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d.). The Army looked to robots. Robots were 
an emerging DARPA and commercial industry technology (“Rapid Equipping Force,” 
n.d.). The VCSA formalized the Robot Tiger Team and, when partnered with DARPA, 
was able to produce three capable robot designs within 30 days that addressed the urgent 
need. The three designs eventually became the PackBot, Marcbot and M7 OCU robots 
(“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d.). Due to the REF’s success in providing quick effective 
solutions in fulfilling the highest priority capability gaps, DOD senior leadership 
extended their mission into Kuwait and Iraq where they teamed up with JIEDDO in their 
efforts to combat IEDs (“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d.). In 2004, the Army embedded an 
ASA(ALT) program manager within the REF to formalize an acquisition process for the 
projects they were supporting (“Rapid Equipping Force,” n.d.).  
REF is structured to integrate three distinct functions to provide the Army 
with a responsive, rapid acquisition organization. First, the REF Director 
has the unique authority to validate requirements. Second, REF has 
acquisition authority provided by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology chartered Project Manager housed 
within REF’s chain of command. Finally, the REF receives funding from a 
variety of sources, allowing it the flexibility to support Soldiers deployed 
around the world. (“Rapid Equipping Force,” 2015, Para. 8) 
The REF’s unique structure eliminated unnecessary bureaucracy opening the door 
for delivering capabilities to warfighters within as little as 72 hours (“Rapid Equipping 
Force,” n.d.). The REF has transitioned to TRADOC and its deployment of equipment 
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processes has become standard for rapidly equipping the warfighter (“Rapid Equipping 
Force,” n.d.). The REF continues to this day to provide capability to the warfighter, but 
the program is now under TRADOC. Its current organization under TRADOC adds 
additional layers of bureaucracy and provides it less independence to its earlier 
organization when it reported directly to the VCSA. 
The REF under the VCSA was able to rapidly field counter sniper capability, 
counter IED capability and other warfighter focused items. One criticism of the REF is 
the lack of backend supportability needed to sustain the supplied gear and equipment. 
Much like when warfighters buy non-standard equipment for their missions the REF does 
not have the capability to address supportability needs and has to rely on quickly 
transferring the fielded items to program management teams for the item’s sustainment. 
The REF still has the ability to respond quickly to urgent needs, but with its current 
organization under TRADOC may not have the ability to transfer the sustainment of 
fielded items as readily as it was able under the VCSA. This change in organization 
makes it less effective for future rapid acquisition needs. 
Senior DOD leadership developed the RFI in the beginning of the global war on 
terrorism (GWoT) to fulfil supply shortages in Afghanistan. Without equipment, a 
Soldier cannot accomplish his mission. The RFI’s sole purpose was to supply equipment 
to those in need. With the increase in troops on the ground scattered to remote locations 
with restricted lines of communication, a lack of supplies was inevitable. Because the 
equipment was designed to support urgent needs, one can see how difficult providing this 
critical gear was to the DOD’s supply system (Gourley, 2012).  
Prior to RFI being put into place, soldiers and units purchased commercial 
items they needed in Iraq/Afghanistan to supplement items the Army 
issued them, they added. As a result, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked 
Program Executive Office Soldier with equipping soldiers as a system to 
support both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF). The soldier as a system model allows for soldiers to 
receive integrated products instead of piece parts. RFI provides an 
equitable distribution of capabilities across our force and facilitates soldier 
modernization in a systematic and integrated manner. (Gourley, 2012, p.1)    
The RFI, as a result of that leadership direction, grew into a juggernaut 
distribution network with over 50 suppliers and industry providers staging and packaging 
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equipment into sets that were designed to provide each warfighter the most up-to-date 
equipment (Gourley, 2012). The RFI updated the list of items per package on a continual 
basis, eliminating older equipment and adding items as needed. Table 1 provides an 
example of a kit. Kitting gear was an effective process that ensured each warfighter 
received exactly what he needed; because gear was not ordered piece by piece, it also 
minimized the logistics footprint (Gourley, 2012). The RFI was so successful that by 
September 2007 it had issued its one-millionth kit to its customers (Gourley, 2012). The 
RFI’s ability to adapt to the needs of the warfighter through ten years of conflict by 
continually improving its ability to deliver critical gear and equipment has changed its 
temporary program status to an essential resourcing requirement for future combat 
operations (Gourley, 2012). 
Table 1.   Example RFI Kit (after Gourley, 2012)  
RFI individual deployment kit NEEDED 
Advanced combat Helmet and accessories 1 
Lightweight Global Positioning System 1 
M4/M16 magazines 6 
Black fleece bibs 2 
Silkweight underwear 4 
Hydration system 1 
Goggles 1 
Glove System 
Cold weather cap 
Infantry combat boot type II 






Moisture wicking TG-shirts 
Combat belt 






Currently, there are no provisions in DOD regulations that can match the supply 
support RFI provided in fulfilling urgent needs. Other DOD rapid fielding initiatives can 
utilize the RFI’s combat proven processes to ensure efficient delivery of critical items 
where and when needed. 
D. JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION 
JIEDDO is an organization created in 2006 to provide IED threat training and 
countermeasures, new IED defeating equipment and systems training in order to defeat 
IEDs as weapons (Martin et al., 2013). JIEDDO’s three lines of operation (LOOs) include 
attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force. These three LOOs 
complimented the REF and RFI organizations by providing rapid training as the 
equipment was fielded (Martin et al., 2013). This joint effort to supply countermeasures 
to IEDs while simultaneously training the force was critical in battling IEDs resulting in a 
reduction in lost lives and injuries. JIEDDOs budgetary authority was another example of 
how effective streamlining bureaucracy and standard processes can be in support of 
approved JUONS. JIEDDO received “colorless” money allowing JIEDDO the flexibility 
to obligate and spend the dollars as needed without restrictions (Martin et al., 2013). 
JIEDDO conducted over 69 percent of its mission in support of an approved JUONS to 
combat the asymmetric threat of IEDs on the battlefield. Enemy insurgent forces used 
IEDs extensively as the main threat to convoys and patrols (Martin et al., 2013). Senior 
DOD leadership created JIEDDO to combat IEDs. Due to JIEDDO’s success, future 
planning should include similar models to combat other asymmetric or contingency-
based threats. 
E. JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL 
On 3 September 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell to meet immediate warfighter needs (IWN) by improving delivery 
of equipment and services to the warfighter due to structural inefficiencies in the normal 
delivery processes (Clagett, 2007). JIEDDO’s success in combating IEDs highlighted the 
need for a similar method to provide a solution for other battlefield threats. The JRAC 
fulfilled that need. The JRAC consists of a core group; OSD comptroller, general 
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counsel, joint staff, AT&L, defense procurement & acquisition policy, combating 
terrorism and technology task force (CTTTF) an advisory group; operational test & 
evaluation, other AT&L offices national assessment group, combatant groups and 
representatives from each of the services (Clagett, 2007). Derived from Bob Stump 
National Defense Act of 2003 (Bob Stump, 2003), the JRAC is an extension of the Rapid 
Acquisition Authority, and has provided over 19 materiel solutions and resolved four 
major equipment maintenance support and training issues. These success stories include 
assessing flexible signal intelligence capability for the GWoT, successfully securing 
funding for coalition jammers, providing recommendations on management and transfer 
of stay behind equipment and sponsoring the Joint Rapid Acquisition Conference in 2006 
(Clagett, 2007). JRAC’s success hinged on the authority it was given to waive statutes 
and regulations, move money regardless of the color and its flexibility to respond to IWN 
concerning combat fatalities (Clagett, 2007). JRAC also played a significant role in 
drafting changes incorporated into DODI 5000.02 specifically with the Rapid Acquisition 
process. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5000.02 
In its 2002 version, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (DODI 5000.02), 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, provided one paragraph pertaining to rapid 
acquisition. Paragraph C2.7.1, which references open systems, provided basic 
instructions to program managers on the open systems approach for upgrading systems 
without conducting major design changes (Department of Defense, 2002). In the 2008 
version, on page 13, the DODI 5000.02 minimally expanded the language regarding rapid 
acquisition process to include “Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD strategy for 
rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user.” In its interim 2013 version, DODI 
5000.02 included Enclosure 13, covering in detail the strategy for the rapid acquisition 
process. In its most recent 2015 version, DODI 5000.02 retains enclosure 13 on the rapid 
acquisition strategy with little changes from the 2013 version. Program offices should 
consider and evaluate these new guidelines to rapid acquisition as the guidelines going 
into effect influence the acquisition of future systems. 
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The document DODI 5000.02 transitioned twice since 2008. The document in its 
original 2008 format did not fully address rapid acquisition and continued to reinforce 
instructions for more traditional acquisition strategies that functioned on timelines that 
are more traditional. DODI 5000.02’s purpose is to establish policy for the strategy and 
management of all acquisition programs. The fact that DODI 5000.02 in 2008 did not 
have adequate provisions for rapid acquisition meant that from a strategic standpoint the 
acquisition community had little recourse but to follow the more traditional acquisition 
strategies.   
After the drawdown in Iraq and before the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan, DODI 5000.02 had an iterative version published in 2013. In this version, 
DODI 5000.02 mentioned rapid acquisition and provided an alternative to the other more 
traditional management strategies for acquisition programs in its own enclosure. In the 
2013 iterative version, as well as in the current 2015 version of DODI 5000.02, rapid 
acquisition is specifically mentioned for all ACAT programs below the cost thresholds of 
ACAT I and IA programs. As a means for rapid acquisition for programs that do fall into 
the categories of ACAT I and IA, DODI 5000.02 does not apparently offer any quick 
reaction capability strategies to fulfill urgent operational needs or other quick reaction 
capabilities for fielding major weapon or vehicle systems in less than two years. DODI 
5000.02, Enclosure 13, Rapid Fielding of Capabilities does step through the JUONs 
process at a high level. The enclosure directs the reader toward using Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS), and DOD Directive (DODD) 5000.71, Rapid Fulfillment 
of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, as needed to facilitate the 
processing of an urgent need.   
The fact that DODI 5000.02 does not address rapid fielding of ACAT I and IA 
programs could be a weakness of the document. Both the MRAP and UAV programs 
were ACAT 1 rapid acquisition programs. Given the funding requirements for these types 
of programs, it would take specific direction from senior DOD leadership to provide 
funding through normal channels. For the MRAP and UAV programs, it took senior 
DOD leadership involvement to secure funding for these programs. Funding for MRAP 
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and UAV was almost 100 percent OCO and as of September 2015, Army MRAP 
programs had not entered the President’s Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle for 
funding, continuing instead to rely almost exclusively on OCO funding until 2017. This 
would suggest that other ACAT I programs in the future that are rapidly acquisition 
programs will not be typical and therefore will not follow a typical program execution 
and rely on strategies outside the scope of the current version of DODI 5000.02.   
G. DODD 5000.71 RAPID FULFILLMENT OF COMBATANT 
COMMANDER URGENT OPERATIONAL NEEDS 
On August 12, 2012, then Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) Ashton 
Carter implemented Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.71, Rapid 
Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, to address the “rapid 
fulfillment of combatant commander urgent operational needs …. This directive 
established policy, assigned responsibilities, and provided direction to facilitate the rapid 
delivery of capabilities in response to UONs, consistent with all applicable laws and 
governing regulations.”   
This directive also established the warfighter senior integration group (SIG), 
which is “a standing DOD-wide forum with the mission of leading and facilitating agile 
and rapid response to UONs and recognizing, responding to, and mitigating the risk of 
operational surprise associated with ongoing or anticipated near-term contingencies” 
(Department of Defense, 2012, p. 12). Enclosure 3 of this directive provides guidance on 
the formation of the warfighter SIG to include membership and responsibilities. The 
warfighter SIG is to be chaired by the DepSecDef and Co-Chaired by the VCJCS. This 
forum also includes multiple General/Flag Officers or Senior Executive Service (SES) 
level representatives from numerous organizations. As the current number of UONs has 
not challenged the warfighter SIG, it is still too premature to designate this command and 
control mechanism as an attribute or detriment to the rapid acquisition process.  
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H. USD (AT&L) MEMORANDUM: USE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE’S 
RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY 
On November 22, 2013, Under Secretary of Defense (USD), Frank Kendall, 
released a memo that provides procedures for requesting rapid acquisition authority 
(RAA) and defines criteria for the use of Secretary of Defense’s RAA. An information 
paper attached to this memorandum identifies procedures for use of RAA. The 
information paper addresses responsibilities, RAA document staffing, and RAA 
procedures. Congress provided the SecDef with special authority too rapidly fulfill 
Combatant Commander UONs, in accordance with section 806 of the Bob Stump 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003 the SecDef can make a RAA 
determination without delegation. This document is crucial because it emphasizes that a 
SecDef RAA determination allows for waivers of “any provision of law, policy, 
directive, or regulation,” with certain limitations, to support rapid acquisition. 
I. AR 70-1 AND DA PAM 70-3 
Army regulation (AR) 70-1 and Department of Army (DA) pamphlet (Pam) 70-3 
implement the Army’s acquisition policy for ACAT I through III programs. AR70-1 is 
the Army’s acquisition policy and DA Pam 70-3 is the Army acquisition procedures. The 
Army last updated AR 70-1 on July 22, 2011, and the AR does not provide any specific 
guidance for rapid acquisition other than referencing DODI 5000.02. The DA Pam 70-3, 
updated on March 11, 2014, does not incorporate the rapid acquisition changes from the 
November 2013 Interim DODI 5000.02. This DA Pam still references rapid acquisition 
guidance from the 2008 DODI 5000.02, page 13, which only addresses rapid acquisition 
by stating: “evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD approach for rapid acquisition 


















III. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. MRAP 
1. MRAP Background 
The MRAP is a mine-resistant vehicle made with a “V”-shaped hull that is able to 
take the energy from the explosive effects of an IED and transfer that energy away from 
or around the vehicle occupants. The Rhodesian Army first built an MRAP-like vehicle 
in the 1970s with further development from South Africa through the 1980s. African 
forces used the MRAP-like vehicle as a defensive measure against roadside bombs and 
had the traditional “V”-shaped hull seen today (MRAP, 2014). In 2004, Britain 
Manufactured a MRAP for the United States Marines, the TSG/FPI Cougar, that 
encountered over 300 IED attacks with no lives lost in 2004 (MRAP, 2014). In 2007, the 
then SecDef Robert Gates placed the acquisition of MRAPS as DODs highest priority, 
earmarking 1.1 billion dollars toward the program. The Services ordered 10,000 MRAPS 
in 2007 from several manufacturers: BAE, Britain, Navistar, Force Protection, and 
General Dynamics to fill a critical need for our military, providing protection from IEDs 
(MRAP, 2014). The MRAP vehicle platforms proved an effective countermeasure against 
IEDs, and by 2009, the DOD had spent 20 billion dollars on the MRAP program (MRAP, 
2014). 
2. Rapid Acquisition in MRAP 
In 2007, due to ongoing operations in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and 
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), efforts related to safe troop transport and 
security were not meeting warfighter needs. The efforts from roughly 2003 through 2008 
were working primarily with older existing U.S. Forces equipment such as HMMWVs 
seeking to increase the protection level for the soldiers and Marines from IEDs and 
Explosive Formed Penetrator (EFP) devices. While the efforts were producing some 
results, the threats were easily defeating the up-armored HMMWVs. However, U.S. 
forces could not wait for the next generation of vehicles, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV), proceeding on its relatively traditionally long acquisition cycle. Then-SecDef 
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Robert Gates recognized these shortcomings and implemented what would become 
termed as rapid acquisition. Rapid acquisition on the scale seen from 2007 until 2012 was 
relatively new to the acquisition community. The program offices involved in the initial 
procurement reduced a typical five to ten year introduction of new material to something 
that the program office fielded to the warfighter in as little as six to eighteen months, 
depending on the system. The DOD has not seen rapid acquisition on this scale since 
World War II. If the acquisition workforce had followed the traditional path following 
regulations and standard practices, programs such as MRAP and UAVs would never have 
reached the levels that they did. Given the speed at which events occur across the globe, a 
traditional acquisition strategy that sacrifices capabilities and pays little attention to 
current events and has more to do with long term spending and strategy puts U.S. 
warfighters at greater risk.   
Defining rapid acquisition in MRAP, the program management team managed to 
get money on contract quickly. It was more than having the funding available and having 
the means to get the necessary requirement on contract in a timely manner. The program 
management team had priority of contracting resources, a DX rating, and the ability to 
process justifications and authorizations (J&As) through to the SecDef level efficiently. 
For MRAP, the Services used five different original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) and placed on an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity4 contract with J&A’s 
supporting sole source contracts for all five OEMs. In MRAP, competition would play 
out on a different level as OEMs received contract awards with a base vehicle that was 
COTS and rapidly transitioning to block upgrades installing additional engineering 
change proposals providing additional capabilities for the warfighter. In addition to the 
contracts with the OEMs were the contracts for field service representative (FSRs) and 
the joint logistics integrator (JLI). The FSRs provided critical support for the fielded 
systems.  Without them, the vehicles would quickly fall into disrepair, as warfighters did 
not have enough organic sustainment support5 to maintain the vehicles. Contracting with 
the JLI was equally challenging as requirements for fielding and support were constantly 
                                                 
4 Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity—(“Indefinite Delivery,” 2015)  
5 Organic sustainment support—Soldiers being able to perform routine maintenance without assistance 
from FSRs. 
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changing. As the requirements and the levels of support needed were changing with the 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan contracts received constant attention with modifications 
to cover the warfighter, the contractors and the DOD acquisition workforce. Without the 
DX rating priority of effort in contracting, other programs’ contracting efforts would 
delay the rapid acquisition, as all contracting actions would go in the queue with all the 
other contracting actions from other programs. DODI 5000.02 does not address this 
priority of contracting effort.  It takes direction and focus from the OSD through to the 
contracting commands to make this occur and to maintain this level of effort. 
While this effort was unprecedented, it was not an individual effort on the part of 
the program office. It took the combined efforts from the SecDef, DepSecDef, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JIEDDO, REF, RIF, DARPA and other organizations assisting and 
directing the joint program office (JPO) in their efforts delivering this capability to the 
warfighter. The organization received constant attention and support with small details 
such as strategic phone conversations, face-to-face encounters and well placed timely 
emails from key members from these supporting organizations that helped to facilitate the 
program. Assistance in removing roadblocks to attaining air priority, attaining surface 
shipment priority, accessing facilities from foreign nations and sidestepping foreign 
nations’ immigration policies were just a few of the major toe tripping issues that the 
unseen conversations helped to mitigate and solve. Without this assistance to removing 
problematic barriers, the delivery of any capability to the warfighter would be hamstrung 
and the program office far less capable of executing their program objectives. 
DOD regulations and supporting documentation do little to structure a program 
for labor to cover the responsibilities for rapidly fielding vehicles within short periods. 
The SecDef heavily bolstered the organization and structure with his influence.  With the 
SecDef’s emphasis and backing, the MRAP and UAV programs were able to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles more readily. One prime example of this was priority of air assets 
to fly vehicles into Afghanistan. Normally, flying vehicles, especially heavy ones like 
MRAP vehicles, would be considered cost prohibitive and would have been shipped with 
ships and ground transport. For several years, MRAPs were third in priority for air assets 
behind food and fuel. Without senior DOD influence, air assets would have followed a 
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heavily bureaucratic process with flights often cancelled or redirected to other seemingly 
more important requirements. 
3. Fielding of Vehicles 
MRAP fielded over 20,000 vehicles to the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
would not have been possible without using every available means of transportation and 
most if not all transportation assets. Without OSD and SecDef involvement, movement of 
vehicles would have been much more constrained. The actual priority of effort regarding 
transportation assets is an additional detail that does not enter into peoples’ thoughts 
when it comes to fielding. The wait time on ships could be more than two–three months 
with lead times that can extend beyond 30 days. Without air priority and money, 
programs would have extreme difficulty in fielding their systems to theaters such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Without the SecDef involvement in these affairs requests for 
arrangements in air assets and the ability to make changes as necessary when production 
did not meet expectations would be too risky for programs and most programs would 
trend toward less risky options for fielding. Options that would take more time and delay 
delivering capability to the warfighter. 
4. Upgrades 
Due to the speed at which DOD fielded MRAPs, program offices conducted 
testing in parallel to fielding assets. Again, DOD regulations and structure does little to 
provide guidance when it comes to this sort of tact. While not recommended, fielding 
systems concurrently with testing offers fielding capability to the warfighter in less time, 
but with considerable risks. All base vehicles fielded under MRAP went through a block 
upgrade at some time in their lifecycles. For MRAP, there were significant upgrades for 
such items as independent suspension systems and engines that delivered better ride 
characteristics and more power. Minor upgrades included safety-related placards and 
ammunition storage capabilities. As program offices fielded the vehicles to units, they 
devised plans that had to coordinate for facilities. Whether or not an upgrade had a bolt-
on solution versus a weld-on solution could jeopardize if the upgrade could be installed in 
Afghanistan or it would have to wait until the vehicle was redeployed CONUS. 
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5. Testing 
For the years 2007–2012, the MRAP program office had priority when it came to 
testing at the test centers. The priority allowed the program to jump the line in many 
cases and push testing for other programs to later dates. This priority was also 
instrumental in pushing the test centers to work significant amounts of overtime to shrink 
the amount of time necessary to complete tests. The MRAP program office embedded 
personnel and other assets at the test centers. The focus of these embedded personnel was 
to schedule testing, arrange logistical support, and ensure that funding was in place to 
support the test centers. Funding needed to cover testing and the test centers overtime 
requirements as well. Another important aspect of maintaining a personnel presence at 
the test centers was to be the eyes and ears for the program office to manage the test 
results and work with the test centers to publish their findings. While the findings were 
not always positive, the program office was able to get ahead of the issues found during 
test much more quickly and put resources into action to resolve the item of interest. 
While testing was underway at the test centers, the program office was fielding 
assets to the warfighter. With concurrent testing, the program office accepted large risks 
as results sometimes yielded results that significantly influenced fielding. While this 
caused significant issues within the program office, the issues were mostly transparent to 
the warfighter. Often the resultant engineering change was able to meet the vehicle in 
theater before the program office delivered it to the warfighter. While logistically 
challenging for the program office, this was best for the warfighter waiting for the 
capability.   
B. UAV 
1. UAV Background 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have accumulated multiple names: remotely 
piloted vehicle, drone, robot plane, and pilotless aircraft are a few such names. Most 
often called UAVs, the DOD defines UAVs as “powered aerial vehicle that does not 
carry a human operator; use aerodynamic forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or  
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remotely piloted; can be expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal 
payload” (Curtin, 2004, p. 3).  
The United States has used some form of aerial reconnaissance since the early 
1900s starting with manned hot air balloons and advancing to drones an earlier version of 
UAVs. During World War I, unmanned aircraft were being developed and tested but 
never saw the battlefield. In 1930, the British Navy developed the Queen Bee a UAV 
capable of speeds up to 100-mph. World War II saw a Nazis developed UAV used to 
target civilians. In the 60s and 70s, the United States conducted over 34,000 surveillance 
missions with the AQM-34, Ryan Firebee, and Firebugs (Shaw, 2014). In the70s through 
the 80s, Israel developed lightweight UAVs, the Scout and the Pioneer, which the U.S. 
also used in the Gulf War (Scheve, 2014). UAVs saw minimal use until the DOD 
developed the Predator to fill a requirement of providing “persistent intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance information combined with a kill capability to the 
warfighter” (Shaw, 2014, Para. 1).  
Abraham Karem was the designing force behind the Predator. He built a UAV 
that could fly for 56 hours and conduct extensive missions, while other UAVs could only 
fly on average two hours. The durability and maintainability of Mr. Karem’s UAVs far 
exceeded any military UAV at the time as well. After several successful demonstrations 
DARPA picked up the UAV program and funded Mr. Karem’s research, which evolved 
into the UAVs used today. During the Bosnian War a need for extensive overhead 
surveillance due to the atrocities happening created an urgent need for UAVs, the drawn 
out military acquisition process used at the time was the key problem getting UAVs into 
action (Shaw, 2014). The Central Intelligence Agency used its capability to operate 
outside of the military as grounds to use a method that skipped the traditional acquisition 
process and had a GNAT UAV flying over Bosnia in one year (Shaw, 2014).   
2. Rapid Acquisition in UAV 
In order to understand the scope of rapid acquisition as applied to the UAV it is 
necessary to review the timelines and initial acquisition strategy implemented to meet the 
joint forces requirements of providing day and night reconnaissance surveillance and 
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target acquisition (Department of Defense, 1993). On 11 March 1985, the Navy and Air 
Force signed a memorandum of agreement to jointly develop unmanned tactical vehicles 
the Air Force accepted responsibility to develop the electro-optical imagery sensors and 
the Navy would develop the unmanned tactical reconnaissance vehicles (Department of 
Defense, 1993). On 8 July 1985, the Secretary of the Navy promulgated a program 
decision memorandum to procure a mid-range remotely piloted vehicle that led to the 
approved acquisition plan on 13 May 1986 (Department of Defense, 1993). In 1986, the 
DOD released a request for proposal covering competitive prototype development. In 
1987, the DOD modified the prototype development into two sub-phases, phase 0, 
consisted of engineering analysis, and a follow-on phase, which would continue through 
milestone III (Department of Defense, 1993). In 1989, the DOD awarded the first fixed 
priced incentive contract to Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical for engineering and 
manufacturing development (Department of Defense, 1993). From 1993 to 2003, the 
DOD contracted from concept to production 163 UAVs (Bone, 2003). From 2004 to 
2006, contractors only produced an additional 2332 UAVs for the missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The additional UAVs had a minimal impact on overall mission 
accomplishment (Department of Defense, 2005).  
In 2007, then SecDef Robert Gates expedited the UAV program, as he understood 
the value they could bring to the battlefield if used correctly. With his influence, Service 
acquisition offices started a rapid acquisition process for all UAVs and UAV missions. 
SecDef Gates directed the Air Force to expand its UAV program despite the resistance 
from Air Force leadership resulting in a 228 percent increase in production from 2007 to 
2013. SecDef Gates commitment to his vision of UAVs on the battlefield was evident as 
he broke down political barriers and requested an equivalent to a blank check funding 
from Congress. The Services challenged SecDef Gates on this front in an effort to retain 
minimal funding for their other active acquisition programs. SecDef Gates pushed his 
agenda forward and finally brought the Services together as the UAV programs expanded 
to include lethal capabilities while maintaining a commanding battlefield presence 
through operators, some of whom were remotely located, conducting surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions. 
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3. Asset Acquisition and Utilization 
The UAV saw minimal use and procurement prior to the SecDef intervention. The 
intervention from SecDef Gates triggered a massive push in development and purpose for 
several versions of the UAV. The UAVs potential was well known but its progress was 
extremely slow due to push back from the Service organization. The Pioneer, a UAV 
deployed during the Gulf War in 1991, flew over 300 combat missions and took 13 years 
to reach 100,000 flight hours. The military only deployed 13 UAVs in March of 2003 at 
the beginning of the Iraq War. This was due to the lack of interest shared by military 
aviation, specifically the Air Force who did not want to move pilots from flying standard 
aircraft to flying unmanned drones. SecDef Gates championed the UAV program and 
directed the services to provide resources and personnel into the UAV program. This 
rapid acquisition format transformed modern warfare by increasing the UAV platforms 
from 13 to 333 variations, which flew over 500,000 hours in a two-year period. UAVs 
currently clock over 24,000 hours each month providing over 360 hours of 
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition data per day (Team, 2010).  
UAVs increased lethality roles by the United States according to “Blowback from 
the New American Way of War,” and have gone through four phases since 2001 
(Hudson, 2011). These phases and increased roles of the UAVs correlates with the 
implementation of the rapid acquisition process. In phase one, UAV’s saw limited action 
on high value targets. Early UAV missions in 2002 and 2004 resulted in the termination 
of two high profile targets: al-Qaeda leader Salim Sinan al-Harethi, and Taliban leader 
Nek Mohammad (Hudson, 2011). In phase two, UAVs saw increased utilization due to 
their early success, but were still limited to high value terrorist targets (Hudson, 2011). 
Phase three consisted of an eight-fold increase in number of phase two strikes seen which 
was the result of the rapid acquisition process started in 2007 (Hudson, 2011). The rapid 
acquisition process also contributed to phase four’s increase in strikes and total deaths 
from UAVs and its success seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   High-Value Targets Ratio (after Hudson, 2011) 
Phase Strikes 






1(2002-2004) 2 2 11 1 to 5 
2(2005-2007) 6 2 53 1 to 26 
3(2008-2009) 48 5 333 1 to 66 
























A. KEY LEADER INVOLVEMENT 
For the MRAP and UAV programs, the SecDef and his staff were the true driving 
force in creating the successful atmosphere. From that level of senior leadership within 
the DOD, the SecDef and his staff were able to set the tone for how the organizations 
within the DOD would relate to not only the MRAP and UAV programs but how they 
relate with one another. The program offices have to have tremendous support during 
rapid acquisition and fielding. Without the SecDef’s influence, the program office will 
have more of a bureaucratic challenge fielding capabilities to the warfighter. This is in 
large part due to risk management and how willing the program office is willing to accept 
risk and the mitigation strategies that it can employ to manage the risk down to an 
acceptable level. Other entities within DOD, because of the their independence, such as 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), have to share in the same objective, 
otherwise those independent agencies cannot or will not accept the risk that may be 
necessary to field the item in question.   
The Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) also plays a role as the conduit to 
the SecDef for information relating to the program as well as the signature authority for 
spending limits as defined by the component agency. In 2007, then SecDef Robert Gates 
understood the issue as ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were facing threats 
unforeseen as warfighters were dealing with IEDs and EFPs on more than a frequent 
basis. The IEDs and EFPs were the chosen methods that insurgent forces were using to 
counter U.S. Forces that could swiftly outgun and out maneuver their actions, whether it 
be toe-to-toe, force on force or simple raids meant to disrupt lines of communication and 
base operations. The IEDs and EFPs could be placed and either remotely detonated, 
command wire detonated, or mechanically operated through the use of pressure plates 
strategically placed in the road. The enemy placed IEDs and EFPs where U.S. forces 
were likely to travel and when triggered were often devastating. To counter the threat a 
new capability to increase the warfighters survivability was required; the issue was how 
to do it quickly. 
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Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan were calling for something that would 
provide some level of protection that was better than the up-armored HMMWV. By using 
ONS and JUONs, commanders created the requirement from which the SecDef could 
respond direct resources and better serve the warfighter. With the requirements 
statements in hand the SecDef was able to focus on what was needed and quickly 
determine his approach to find a solution to meet the warfighter’s needs. For the SecDef, 
his answer was not in DODI 5000.02. Using that document and following its direction 
would not provide a solution in anything less than four to five years. Instead, the SecDef 
pulled his resources and quickly determined that there were solutions readily available 
from within the United States and from outside as well. Program offices could quickly 
purchase COTS solutions for the warfighter, ship and deliver the capability within 
months as opposed to years of development followed by years of testing and 
subsequently followed by production and fielding. 
The SecDef through his direction created the JPO MRAP headed by the Marine 
Corps. Within months of formulating the concept, the warfighter was driving vehicles 
that could withstand the effects of IEDs and EFPs. Had the SecDef relied solely on then 
existing regulations and direction U.S. Forces may still be suffering under the constant 
threat of IEDs and EFPs and the acquisition workforce would be struggling to keep 
upgrading existing technologies that did little to keep the warfighter out of harm’s way. 
Politics aside, while it took considerable resources to put MRAPs in place, it also took a 
SecDef that was willing to place his political capital on the line.   
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JRAC AND JIEDDO ORGANIZATIONS 
The JRAC and JIEDDO organizations abilities to recolor money and apparent 
ability to act without undue interference during the Iraq and Afghanistan missions 
provided the foundation for rapid acquisition successes. JIEDDO’s efforts to supply 
countermeasures to IEDs while simultaneously training the force was critical in battling 
IEDs resulting in a reduction in lost lives and injuries. JIEDDO’s budgetary authority was 
a standard that was effective in supporting approved JUONS. JIEDDO’s ability to re-
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color money provided the flexibility to obligate and spend the dollars as needed without 
restrictions (Martin et al., 2013).   
As the JRAC was able to leverage success from JIEDDO’s earlier efforts, the 
JRAC’s earlier organization was a critical rapid acquisition success. In its earlier version 
the JRAC consisted of a core group and existed as an extension of the RAA and provided 
over 19 materiel solutions and resolved four major equipment maintenance support and 
training issues. JRACs success hinged on the authority it received in waiving statutes and 
regulations, moving money regardless of the color and its flexibility to respond to IWN 
concerning combat fatalities (Clagett, 2007). JRAC also played a significant role in 
drafting changes incorporated into DODI 5000.02 specifically with the rapid acquisition 
process. Given JRAC’s ability to influence and shape rapid acquisition, future rapid 
acquisition efforts should be able to benefit from a similarly organized effort. 
As senior DOD leadership continues to push the JIEDDO and JRAC 
organizations into a more bureaucratic and controlled process it will reduce the 
effectiveness of those organizations. Without the flexibility and funding to pursue urgent 
needs these organizations will become less effective for rapid acquisition.  
C. FUNDING AND COLORS OF MONEY 
As stated earlier in the JIEDDO and JRAC findings, funding and the ability to re-
color funds is vital to any rapid acquisition program. Not only did the JIEDDO and JRAC 
organizations have the ability to re-color money, senior DOD leadership extended that 
privilege to the MRAP and UAV programs. With that ability, those organizations had the 
flexibility to spend money where to the dictates of their respective missions. While rapid 
acquisition was occurring, these programs and organizations did not the luxury to wait on 
Congressional approval as that takes time. For these organizations involved in rapid 
acquisition, time was more critical than cost and types of funding.    
Congress will control the flow of money for rapid acquisition. Without senior 
leader involvement, these teams would not have had the ability to direct funds. As the 
MRAP, UAV and other rapid acquisition organizations move toward standard practices, 
the knowledge gleaned from those programs will continue to dissipate. 
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D. CONTRACTING AND ORDERING PRIORITY 
As a designated rapid acquisition program, having priority when it comes to 
contracting and placing orders for spare parts is part of the process. Without that priority, 
the MRAP and UAV programs would have languished waiting to let their contracts. As a 
rapid acquisition program, it would have meant little for DOD senior leaders to designate 
them as such if it meant going into the contracting queue like any other program. It would 
slow the process down and would not provide the benefit needed for the warfighter. 
Without senior DOD leadership willing to commit to designating programs with a DX 
rating, program management teams for rapid acquisition items will be fall into line with 
everyone else. 
E. RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY AND WAIVERS 
The RAA signed by USD Kendall was a large step forward in the rapid 
acquisition process but it is not enough. Without the authority to seek waivers, program 
offices will run into unnecessary roadblocks on their rapid acquisition programs. The 
ability to run concurrent testing with procurement can save time in fielding capabilities to 
the warfighter. The RAA is the one true bright spot in the withering rapid acquisition 
capability. However, it cannot be the only tool left for the program management teams.   
F. FOCUSING FIELDING PRIORITIES ON THE WARFIGHTER 
The warfighter was the focus on rapid acquisition programs. For the JRAC, 
JIEDDO, REF, RFI and acquisition program offices, the warfighter was the ultimate 
benefactor in their missions. The organizations have to have the resources and the 
direction from senior leadership to maintain that focus. Maintaining that focus is an 
absolute. As program offices that were once rapid acquisition oriented become more 
traditionally minded the programs become more focused on costs and performance and 
less concerned about warfighter’s urgent needs. Current DOD senior leadership is 
mindful of rapid acquisition capability, but without an ongoing urgent need program 




A. KEY LEADER PROGRAM ADVOCATE 
We recommend that DOD senior leadership identify roles and responsibilities for 
the rapid acquisition processes. Throughout our research, it was evident that bureaucracy 
among the branches made it difficult to support key program functions. The Services 
were reluctant to support non-traditional acquisition programs and they did not want to 
reallocate funds from approved programs to new projects resulting from JUONS 
submitted by field commanders. This created a challenge for then SecDef Robert Gates 
who took it upon himself to champion two major programs, the UAV and MRAP. SecDef 
Gates involvement was paramount in establishing full congressional and Service support 
for these major programs. SecDef Gates implemented the blank check and colorless 
money strategies that revolutionized rapid acquisition processes. DOD should utilize the 
actions taken by the Honorable Robert Gates by incorporating them into training doctrine 
for future leaders to study and implement as needed. 
B. RAPID ACQUISITION FUNDING 
DODI 5000.02 does not sufficiently address funding rapid acquisition programs.  
From our research, evidence suggests DOD should prioritize funding and reprogram 
funding as necessary to expedite the acquisition process. Programs approved for rapid 
acquisition should not have to compete for funds with traditional acquisition programs. 
Earmarking annual funds to support rapid acquisition contingency plans is an optimal 
method that increases programs success rates.   
In a hearing conducted by the House of Representative Armed Services 
Committee on 8 October 2009, the panel on defense acquisition recommended that the 
executive and legislative branch create a fund for rapid acquisition and fielding. The 
recommendation suggested that 0.5 percent of the DOD budget be the baseline with a cap 
of three billion non-expiring dollars be available and replenished annually (DOD’s Rapid 
Acquisition Process, 2009). After evaluating our data from the UAV and MRAP 
programs, which both exceeded 10 billion dollars within the first year, it would be 
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advisable that this fund be at a minimum five billion dollars. We did not think that in the 
future two major programs would be designated DX programs at the same time nor 
would they require excess funding as these programs did. If the DOD applied the lessons 
learned in funding the MRAP and UAV programs correctly, five billion dollars of non-
expiring dollars would be able to support every critical need approved for rapid 
acquisition and fielding until additional funding can be redirected by DOD or allocated 
by congress. 
C. IMPROVEMENTS TO DODI 5000.02  
Our research also supports recommending that DOD should include ACAT I and 
IA acquisition program guidelines into the DODI 5000.02. As our research showed, 
applying the rapid acquisition principles to ACAT I & IA programs is an effective way to 
streamline the normal processes required to fill critical needs identified by users. Once 
approved, the MRAP & UAV programs provided users several systems utilized on the 
battlefield in as little as four months. These capabilities enhanced battlefield operations in 
reconnaissance, surveillance, protection and lethality.  
MRAPs provided protection from IEDs immediately improving the warfighters’ 
moral and confidence in their equipment. The initial success of the MRAP vehicles 
justified the need for additional platforms, which the program office developed through 
the rapid acquisition process. USA Today estimated that 40,000 service members’ lives 
were saved by MRAPs, Defense secretary Robert Gates stated that “MRAPs have saved 
thousands of lives and limbs” (Brook, 2012, Para. 6). Without the rapid acquisition 
process, these life and limb saving vehicles would not have been available at all. 
Lessons learned from these programs should be included into DODI 5000.02 and 
used to provide guidance for future ACAT I & IA programs identified to fill critical 
needs. At a minimum, DOD should address the following areas. First, an approval 
process that identifies the chain of command and requirements for rapid acquisition of 
ACAT I & IA programs. Second, identify how DOD will fund rapid acquisition 
programs. Third, identify who in DOD will designate milestone requirements and 
milestone guidelines for ACAT I & IA programs.  
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D. RAPID ACQUISITION PROCUREMENT PERIOD 
We recommend reducing the requirement from two years down to 12 months for 
fielding rapid acquisition capabilities. This takes into consideration the fact that 
requirements in DODI 5000.02 limits rapid acquisition to technologies that are proven 
and available, that technologies do not require substantial development effort and DOD 
entities acquire these technologies under a fixed price contract. As research indicated, 
fulfilling warfighter urgent needs through the traditional acquisition process has 
historically been a lengthy process that has left our forces with few options to combat 
threats on the battlefield. 
Research showed that the warfighter would create their own solutions to combat 
these challenges with Special Forces soldiers going as far as modifying their M4s with 
COTS items to increase its reliability (Scarborough, 2014). Prior to 2007, the average 
Navy/Marine deployment was seven months with the typical Army deployment 
averaging twelve months and the Air Force deployment averaging four months. Army 
deployments after 2007 increased to fifteen months (Powers, 2015). In 2011, the Army 
reduced its rotation to nine months (Shaughnessy, 2011). The average deployment across 
the Services is roughly eight months. Given this average typical deployment it makes 
more sense to re-evaluate the two-year requirement and reduce it to twelve months. 
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While Army MRAP and UAV programs contend with the future of their 
programs, there does not exist a current requirement for a rapid acquisition process on the 
scale of MRAP or UAV. It is important to remember that the DOD has not seen rapid 
acquisition processes on this size and scale since WWII, but U.S. Forces have been in 
three major conflicts before the most current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
While laws and regulations governing acquisition processes place demands on the 
program management teams, direct oversight from Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and his 
staff provide the emphasis needed for rapid acquisition success. That oversight extends to 
contracting, organization and maintaining a warfighter focus. Without that key leadership 
involvement, the DOD does not have the capability entrenched enough to maintain the 
lessons learned from the MRAP and UAV programs and other organizations such as the 
JRAC and JIEDDO teams and will not be able to meet the next rapid acquisition 
requirement readily. 
Throughout our research into the rapid acquisition process, several key findings 
were evident. First, the DOD needs a rapid acquisition process to support the warfighters 
who are at risk and suffer the most from inaction or delayed procurement actions as 
resolutions to critical needs navigate through the approval process. Sometimes 
requirements force warfighters to improvise and take matters into their own hands until 
an official decision has been made and implemented, a process that can take several years 
under our current system. We agree that DODI 5000.02 Enclosure 13 is a step in the right 
direction in improving our critical needs resolution process. DODI 5000.02 provides 
guidance to accelerate the acquisition processes for urgent acquisitions by reducing 
timelines required for mandatory documents or eliminating documents altogether.  
Second, acquisition culture is a critical driver for implementing an effective rapid 
acquisition system and it is imperative that leaders understand and support the directives 
established in DODI 5000.02. Changing the culture of acquisition to embrace these new 
directives is challenging but necessary.  
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Third, organizational structure must remain in place to support the rapid 
acquisition process, we must be able to design it, make it and field it to be successful. 
JROC, JRAC, REF, RFI, JIEDDO and DARPA are organizations that supported urgent 
needs throughout the scope of our research and it is realistic to say that DOD will not be 
able to keep these organizations intact. The REF has already transitioned to TRADOC 
and DARPA’s role has diminished as urgent need submissions diminish.  
Fourth, SecDef influence was the biggest driver for the programs we researched.  
If it was not for SecDef Gates intervention to the process it is difficult to speculate if the 
MRAP and UAV roles would have been as paramount to battlefield safety and operations 
as they were. SecDef Gates leadership, vision, and resource allocation guidance set the 
example of how the DOD could implement rapid acquisition. Consistent with our 
recommendations it is crucial that DOD be able to replicate the processes that worked for 
the UAV and MRAP into other programs identified for rapid acquisition to be successful. 
In our opinion, rapid acquisition in DODI 5000.02 will burden the processes. DODI 
5000.02 does not cover ACAT 1 and 1A programs, the timeline of two years is too long, 
and it only allocates 200 Million per fiscal year in funding for rapid acquisition. The 
SecDef should address these critical shortfalls as a system improvement measure. We 
strongly feel it is imperative that DOD initiates cultural change through training, 
leadership appointments, and command influence; these intangible efforts will provide 
the foundation for resolving future urgent needs. 
Our analysis of current rapid acquisition organizations, policies, and prior 
programs has led to four major recommendations. First, we want to emphasis the 
importance of a key leader program advocate. Secondly, we recommend increasing the 
RAA budget of only 200 million dollars per fiscal year to 400 million dollars or higher. 
Third, we recommend including ACAT I and IA Acquisition program guidelines into the 
DODI 5000.02. Lastly, we recommend changing the rapid acquisition procurement 
period from two years to one year. These recommendations may warrant additional 




APPENDIX A.  DODI 5000.02 ENCLOSURE 13 COMPARISON 
The 2008 and previous version of DODI 5000.02 minimally address rapid 
acquisition.  These versions only suggest, “Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD 
strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user.”  The interim DODI 
5000.02 November 2013 version adds enclosure 13, which specifically addresses rapid 
acquisition of urgent needs.  The 2015 version also includes enclosure 13 with a few 
modifications.  Table 3 shows enclosure 13 changes from the 2013 interim version to the 
current DODI 5000.02 January 2015 version.  The first column shows enclosure 13 from 
the 2013 interim version and the second column highlights the updates in the 2015 
version. 
Table 3.   Enclosure 13 Comparison 
(Interim DODI 5000.02 November 2013) 
 
 
RAPID ACQUISITION OF URGENT NEEDS 
 
 1. PURPOSE. This enclosure provides 
policy and procedures for acquisition 
programs that provide capabilities to 
fulfill urgent needs that can be fielded in 
less than 2 years and which are below the 
cost thresholds of Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) I and IA programs. 
 
2. URGENT NEEDS 
a. DOD’s highest priority is to provide 
warfighters involved in conflict or 
preparing for imminent contingency 
operations with the capabilities urgently 
needed to overcome unforeseen threats, 
achieve mission success, and reduce risk 
of casualties, as described in DOD 
Directive 5000.71 (Reference (ci)). The 
objective for the rapid acquisition of 
urgent needs is to deliver capability 
(DODI 5000.02 January 2015) 
 
The title has been updated to RAPID 
FIELDING OF CAPABILITIES. 
 
1. The purpose has been updated to also 



















quickly, within days or months. DOD 
Components will use all available 
authorities to expeditiously fund, 
develop, assess, produce, deploy, and 
sustain urgent need capabilities for the 
duration of the urgent need, as 
determined by the requesting DOD 
Component. 
 
b. Approval authorities for each type of 
urgent need will be delegated to a level 
that promotes rapid action. This 
enclosure applies to the following types 
of urgent needs: 
 
(1) A validated Urgent Operational Need 
(UON). UONs include: 
(a) Joint Urgent Operational Needs 
(JUONs) and Joint Emergent Operational 
Needs (JEONs). For JUONs and JEONs, the 
validation approval will be by the Joint 
Staff in accordance with Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
3170.01H (Reference (j)). Program 
execution for JUONs and JEONs will be 
assigned in accordance with DOD 
Directive 5000.71 (Reference (ci)). The 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), for 
JUONs and JEONs will be determined at 
the DOD Component level except in very 
rare cases when the MDA will be 
designated in an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) by the Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE). 
(b) DOD Component-specific UONs, as 
defined in CJCSI 3170.01H and further 
discussed in DOD Directive 5000.71. 
Approval authorities for DOD Component 
UONs, including their validation, program 
execution, and the designation of the 
MDA will be at the DOD Component level. 
 











































(2) Changed from Chairman to Co-Chair 
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the warfighter Senior Integration Group 
(SIG) in accordance with DOD Directive 
5000.71, hereafter referred to as 
warfighter SIG urgent needs. The 
Chairman of the warfighter SIG will 
approve the urgent need and provide 
instructions to DOD Component(s) on 
program execution and management. 
 
(3) A Secretary of Defense Rapid 
Acquisition Authority (RAA) 
Determination, in accordance with 
section 806(c) of P.L. 107-314 (Reference 
(p)). Secretary of Defense RAA 
Determinations task a DOD Component 
to fulfill the urgent need and will be 
handled in accordance with DOD 
Directive 5000.71 (Reference (ci)). The 
MDA for RAA Determinations will be 
designated at the DOD Component level 
except in very rare cases when the MDA 
will be designated in an ADM by the DAE. 
 
c. DOD Components will designate a 
single official responsible for DOD 
Component UON validation and 
nomination to the Component 
Acquisition Executive (CAE) for execution 
as an urgent need, as defined in CJCSI 
3170.01H (Reference (j)). UONs will be 
validated in accordance with procedures 
established by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff for JUONs and JEONs in 
CJCSI 3170.01H or the DOD Component 
for Component UONs. 
 
d. MDAs and program managers will 
tailor and streamline program strategies 
and oversight. This includes program 
information, acquisition activity, and the 
timing and scope of decision reviews and 
decision levels. Tailoring and streamlining 
should be based on program complexity 
for approving critical warfighter issues 
and provide instructions to DOD 







(3) Changed language to:   
This is a Secretary of Defense signed 
determination that is made in response 
to a documented deficiency following 
consultation with the Joint Staff. RAA 
should be considered when, within 
certain limitations, a waiver of a law, 
policy, directive, or regulation will greatly 
accelerate the delivery of effective 
capability to the warfighter in accordance 

























and the required timelines to meet 
urgent need capability requirements 
consistent with applicable laws and 
regulations. 
 
e. DOD Components will employ, to the 
extent possible, parallel rather than 
sequential processes to identify and 
refine capability requirements, identify 
resources, and execute acquisitions to 
expedite delivery of solutions. Formal 
milestone events may not be required. 
Acquisition decision making and 
associated activity will be tailored to 
expedite acquisition of the capability. 
Development will generally be limited 
and the MDA can authorize production at 
the same time development is approved. 
 
f. DOD Components will ensure that 
financial, contracting, and other support 
organizations 
(e.g., Defense Contract Audit Agency, 
Defense Contract Management Agency, 
General Counsel) and prime and sub-tier 
contractors involved with aspects of the 
urgent need acquisition program are fully 
aware of the urgency of the need and will 
ensure expedited action. 
 
g. Generally, funds will have to be 
reprioritized and/or reprogrammed to 
meet urgent needs and to expedite the 
acquisition process. If a need can be 
satisfied within an acceptable timeline 
through the normal Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
System, it would not be considered 
appropriate for rapid acquisition. 
 
h. Consistent with the emphasis on 
urgency, if the desired capability cannot 































g. Changed from satisfied to fielded 









h. changed from chairman to co-chair.  
Critical warfighter issues identified by the 
warfighter SIG, per DOD Directive 
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identification of the urgent need, the 
MDA will assess the suitability of partial 
or interim capabilities that can be fielded 
more rapidly. In those cases, the actions 
necessary to develop the desired solution 
may be initiated concurrent with the 
fielding of the interim solution. 
warfighter SIG urgent needs or Secretary 
of Defense RAA determinations will be 
addressed as determined by the 
Chairman, warfighter SIG, or by the 
official designated for action in the 
Secretary of Defense RAA Determination. 
 
3. RAPID ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES. The 
following paragraphs describe the main 
activities associated with the Rapid 
Acquisition of Urgent Needs: Pre 
Development, Development, Production, 
and Operations and Support. The 
activities detailed in this enclosure are 
not separate from or in addition to 
activities performed as part of the 
acquisition system but are a highly 
tailored version of those activities and are 
intended to expedite urgent needs by 
tailoring the documentation and reviews 
normally required as part of the 
deliberate acquisition process. 
 
a. Pre-Development 
(1) Purpose. The purpose of Pre-
Development is to assess and select a 
course or courses of action to resolve an 
urgent need and develop an acquisition 
approach. 
(2) Initiation. Pre-Development initiation 
requires approval of an urgent need 
statement: 
a validated UON, warfighter SIG urgent 
need statement or a Secretary of Defense 
RAA determination document. 
(3) Pre-Development Activities.  
5000.71 (Reference (cc)), will be 
addressed as determined by the Co-
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(a) A validated UON statement, approved 
warfighter SIG urgent need statement, or 
the Secretary of Defense RAA 
Determination serves as the validated or 
approved requirements document until 
such time as the disposition action 
discussed in paragraph 3.f.(5) of this 
enclosure is complete. 
(b) Upon receipt of an approved urgent 
need, the designated CAE will 
immediately appoint a Program Manager 
and an MDA. If the DAE has retained 
MDA authority, he or she will either 
appoint a Program Manager or task a CAE 
to do so. 
(c) The Program Manager in collaboration 
with the intended user: 
1. Reviews the urgent need requirement 
and any recommended non-materiel 
options and, if not adequately stated in 
the validated UON, the RAA 
Determination, or SIG designated issue, 
will determine the performance 
thresholds for the minimal set of 
performance parameters required to 
mitigate the capability gap. 
2. Performs an analysis of potential 
courses of action (COAs) that consider: 
a. The range of feasible capabilities, to 
include consideration of an existing 
domestic or foreign-made system. 
b. The acquisition risk (cost, schedule, 
and performance) and the operational 
risk of each solution. 
c. The operational risk to the requesting 
Commander if an effective solution is not 
deployed by the time specified in the 
urgent need. 
d. Multiple, simultaneous, near, mid, 
and/or long term capabilities to fulfill the 
urgent need. 
3. Develops a recommended COA for 





























a. combined with bullet d. 
The range of feasible capabilities, near, 
mid, and/or long term, to include 
consideration of an existing domestic or 
foreign-made system. 
 
c.  changed from specified in the urgent 






3. changed from develops to presents 
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4. If the Program Manager is unable to 
identify an effective solution, the 
Program Manager will notify the MDA. 
The MDA will in turn notify the DOD 
Component validation authority. If it is a 
JUON or JEON, a warfighter SIG urgent 
need, or a Secretary of Defense RAA 
Determination, the MDA will notify the 
DAE and the Deputy Director of 
Requirements, Joint Staff, through the 
Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. 
(d) The Program Manager will present the 
recommended COA(s) to the MDA for a 
COA selection. Once the MDA selects the 
COA(s), this decision will be documented 
in an ADM. More than one COA may be 
selected by the MDA to provide the 
phased or incremental fielding of 
capabilities. 
(e) Following the selection of the COA(s) 
by the MDA, the Program Manager will 
develop a complete acquisition approach 
(or acquisition approaches if more than 
one COA has been approved by the 
MDA), and an abbreviated program 
baseline (or baselines for multiple COAs) 





(f) The acquisition approach will comply 
with statutory requirements in Table 10 
and specified items in Table 2 of 
Enclosure 1; however, a streamlined, 
highly tailored approach consistent with 
the urgency of the need will be 
employed. Regulatory requirements will 
be tailored or waived. The tailored 
Acquisition Strategy should be relatively 
brief and contain only essential 
information to the extent possible, such 












Presents recommended COA to MDA and 







(e) added the following to this section: In 
the context of this enclosure, the 
documentation requirement is for the 
minimal amount necessary to define and 
execute the program and obtain MDA 
approval. This documentation may take 
any appropriate, written form; will 
typically be coordinated only with directly 
affected stakeholders; and will evolve in 
parallel with rapid acquisition activities as 
additional information becomes available 














deliverables, performance parameters, a 
production schedule, a contracting 
methodology and key terms, preliminary 
plans for Assessment (which may or may 
not include test and evaluation), 
deployment, training, and sustainment. 
Information technology (IT) and National 
Security Systems (NSS) provided in 
response to an urgent need do require an 
Authority to Operate or an Interim 
Authority to Operate in accordance with 
DOD Instruction 8510.01 (Reference (bx)). 
A disposition decision should be made as 
early as feasible and decided upon at 
appropriate milestones or other decision 
points. 
(g) Funding for urgent needs may be in 
increments over the urgent need's 
lifecycle. 
The urgent need life-cycle begins upon 
the receipt of an urgent need and ends 
upon completing the final disposition of 
the capability provided in response to the 
urgent need as described in the 
Operations and Support portion of this 
enclosure. 
(h) When designing the acquisition 
approach, the Program Manager, in 
collaboration with the requesting 
operational commander or sponsoring 
user representative will determine 
whether an operational prototype is 
necessary. 
(i) If the program has been placed on 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 
(DOT&E) oversight, a plan for operational 
testing must be approved by the DOT&E. 
DOT&E will report the results of required 
testing to the Secretary of Defense and 
provide copies to Congress and the MDA 
 
b. Development Milestone. Entry into 
Development is approved by the MDA. 
 

















(g) changed to program lifecycle begins 








(h) Updated to include prototype 
















(1) The Program Manager will present the 
acquisition approach to include the 
program requirements, schedule, 
activities, program funding, and the 
Assessment Approach and intermediate 
decision points and criteria. 
(2) The MDA will: 
(a) Determine the feasibility of resolving 
the urgent need within the required 
timelines to include consideration of the 
technical maturity of the preferred 
solution(s). 
(b) Review the acquisition approach and 
determine whether the preferred 
solution(s): 
1. Can be fielded within 2 years. 
2. Does not require substantial 
development effort. 
3. Is based on technologies that are 
proven and available. 
4. Can be acquired under fixed price. 
(c) Provide any exceptions necessary 
pursuant to section 804 (b)(3) of P.L. 111-
383 
(Reference (z)), including exceptions to 
the requirements of paragraphs 
3.b.(2)(b)1 through 3.b.(2)(b)4. 
(d) Approve initial quantities to be 
produced and assessed (to include 
required assessment and training 
articles). 
(e) Approve a tailored Acquisition 
Strategy and Acquisition Program 
Baseline. These documents will be based 
on readily available information and will 
mature over time into a more robust 
plan. 
(f) Decide if RAA, in accordance with 
section 806(c) of P.L. 107-314 (Reference 
(p)), should be requested from the 
Secretary of Defense to expedite the 
urgent need’s resolution. 
(g) In collaboration with the supporting 
 
(1) The program manager will also 











(b) review Acquisition strategy and 
program baseline and determine whether 

















(e) Approve the tailored Acquisition 
Strategy and Acquisition Program 
Baseline. These documents will be based 
on available information to be updated 
over time as directed by the MDA. 
(f) Changed from expedite the urgent 




(g) Updated language. Approve the 
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operational test organization, approve a 
highly tailored and abbreviated Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The 
TEMP will describe a performance 
Assessment plan that will include 
schedule, test types and environment, 
and assets required. If the defense rapid 
acquisition program is on DOT&E 
oversight, the Program Manager must 
then prepare a combined operational and 












(h) Approve any waivers to statute (if 
permitted by statute) or regulation. 
Specify any additional authority the 
Program Manager may use to modify the 
acquisition approach without the specific 
approval of the MDA. 
(i) Authorize release of the request for 
proposals and related documents for 
development and any other MDA 
approved actions. 
(j) Document these decisions in an ADM. 
 
c. Development Activities 
(1) Development includes an Assessment 
of the performance, safety, suitability, 
and survivability of the capability, but 
does not require that all identified 
deficiencies including those related to 
safety be resolved prior to production or 
deployment. The MDA will, in 
consultation with the user, determine 
planned testing approach. A normal Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is 
generally not necessary. TEMPs are 
usually not appropriate for rapid 
acquisitions when there is minimal 
development work and minimal T&E to 
execute. Some test planning is usually 
required, however. In collaborate with 
the supporting operational test 
organization, a highly tailored and 
abbreviated test plan may be required by 
the MDA. The abbreviated test plan will 
describe a performance assessment 
approach that will include schedule, test 
types and environment, and assets 
required. An Operational Test Plan for the 
required pre-deployment performance 
assessment is generally adequate. If the 
defense rapid acquisition program is on 
DOT&E oversight, a TEMP is also not 
normally required; however, the Program 
Manager should prepare a combined 



















In consultation with the user and the 
requirements validation authority, 
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which deficiencies must be resolved and 
what risks can be accepted. 
(2) IT and NSS provided in response to an 
urgent need require an Authority to 
Operate or an Interim Authority to 
Operate (DOD Instruction 8510.01 
(Reference (bx))). DOD Component Chief 
Information Officers will establish 
processes consistent with DOD 
Instruction 8510.01 for designated 
approval authorities to expeditiously 
make the certification determinations 
and to issue Interim Authorization to 
Test, Authority to Operate, or Interim 
Authority to Operate. 
 
d. Production Milestone 
(1) Entry into Production and Deployment 
is approved by the MDA. 
(2) At the Production Milestone review: 
(a) The Program Manager will summarize 
the results of Development activity and 
the program Assessment. The Program 
Manager will present plans to transport, 
deploy, and sustain the capability; to 
conduct Post-Fielding Assessments; and 
to train maintenance and operating 
personnel. This information will be 
provided to the MDA for approval. 
(b) The MDA, in consultation with the 
supporting operational test organization, 
and with the approval of DOT&E for 
programs on DOT&E oversight, will 
determine when Postfielding 
Assessments are required, whether the 
urgent need solution has been 
adequately reviewed, performs 
satisfactorily, is supportable, and is ready 
for production and deployment. 
(c) The MDA decides whether to produce 
and deploy the system, approves the 
updated acquisition approach (which will 
include the sustainment plan), and 
 
 
(2) IT, including NSS, fielded under this 







































Added Program Baseline. 
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documents the 
Production Decision in an ADM. This 
decision should be coordinated, when 
feasible, with the intended user. 
 
e. Production and Deployment Activities 
(1) During Production and Deployment 
the acquiring organization provides the 
warfighter with a capability that satisfies 
the urgent need to include any required 
training, spares, technical data, computer 
software, support equipment, 
maintenance, or other logistics support 
necessary for operation. 
(a) DOD Components will ensure urgent 
need acquisition program capabilities and 
required support (e.g., field service 
representatives, training) are deployed by 
the most expeditious means possible and 
tracked through to their actual delivery to 
the user. 
(b) The DOD Components will coordinate 
with each other and the requiring activity 
to verify the total requirement, 
considering necessary support and spares 
and including required training capability 
for deployed and/or pre-deployment 
training. 
(2) Upon deployment, the capability will 
enter into Operations and Support. 
 
f. Operations and Support 
(1) The Program Manager will execute a 
support program that meets materiel 
readiness and operational support 
performance requirements, and sustains 
the urgent need acquisition program 
product in the most cost-effective 
manner over its anticipated total life 
cycle. Planning for Operation and Support 
will begin during Pre-Development and 
will be documented in the Program 






















Changed to: Verify the total number of 






















(2) The capability is operated and 
supported consistent with the 
sustainment plan approved by the MDA 
at the Production Milestone. 
(3) The Program Manager or the user may 
propose urgently needed improvements 
to the capability. If within the scope of 
the approved urgent need, this enclosure 
may be used to acquire the 
improvements. All improvements must 
be approved by the MDA and may be 
funded, developed, and assessed in 
accordance with the procedures in this 
enclosure if urgent need criteria are met. 
If improvements are outside the scope of 
the validated or approved requirement, a 
new or amended urgent need statement 
may be required. 
(4) In collaboration with the original 
requirement sponsor, a post-fielding 
Assessment will be conducted after 
deployment by the DOD Component on 
all capabilities fielded as urgent needs. If 
practical, this Assessment will be 
conducted in the field by the supporting 
operational test organization. If not 
practical, the Program Manager may use 
alternate means for this 
Assessment to include Program Manager 
or operational test agency Assessment of 
user feedback or other DOD Component 
feedback. All programs under DOT&E 
Oversight will be independently reviewed 
and approved by DOT&E. 
(5) Disposition Analysis. No later than 1 
year after the program enters Operations 
and 
Support (or earlier if directed by the DOD 
Component), the DOD Component will 
appoint an official to conduct a 
Disposition Analysis. Based on the 
analysis, the DOD Component Head and 






Changed to: If within the scope of the 
initial requirements document, 
procedures in this enclosure may be used 










Changed from requirement sponsor to 
requesting DOD component and post-
























document for disposition of the product. 
The disposition analysis will consider the 
performance of the fielded system, long 
term operational needs and, the 
relationship of the capability to the 
component’s current and planned 
inventory of equipment. The analysis will 
also consider the continuation of non-
materiel initiatives, the extension of 
science and technology developments 
related to the fielded capability, and the 
completion of MDA-approved and funded 
materiel improvements. The disposition 
official will recommend one of the 
following options: 
(a) Termination: Demilitarization or 
Disposal. The system will be demilitarized 
and disposed of in accordance with all 
legal and regulatory requirements and 
policy related to safety (including 
explosive safety) and the environment. 
The recommendation will be coordinated 
with the DOD Component or, for JUONS 
and JEONS, the Combatant Commands. 
(b) Sustainment for Current Contingency. 
The system will continue operation and 
sustainment as an urgent need for the 
current contingency. Multiple 
sustainment decisions may be made 
should the capability require operations 
and support longer than 2 years; 
however, such sustainment decisions will 
be made and re-documented at least 
every 2 years. The sustained urgent need 
solution will continue to receive the same 
priority of action as the original urgent 
need solution. This recommendation will 
be coordinated with the DOD Component 
validation authority. 
(c) Transition to Program of Record. If the 
program provides a needed, enduring 
capability, it may be transitioned to a 













































will recommend to the CAE the 
acquisition point of entry into the 
defense acquisition system, and whether 
the MDA should retain program authority 
or whether it should transition 
elsewhere. The DOD Component 
validation authority will specify the 
capability requirements documents 
required to support transition to a new or 
existing program of record. This 
recommendation will be made to the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for JUONs, 
JEONs, warfighter SIG urgent needs, or 
Secretary of Defense RAA 
determinations, or to the DOD 
Component Head for Component specific 
UONs. 
(6) The DOD Component Head and the 
CAE will review the disposition official’s 
recommendation and record the 
Component Head’s transition decision in 
a Disposition Determination. The 
Determination will specify the 
requirements documents required by the 
validation authority to support the 
transition. Programs of record will follow 
the procedures described in the core 
instruction. 
 
4. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. 
Provides Information Requirements that 
are unique to the Rapid Acquisition of 
Urgent Needs and pertain to urgent 
needs below the cost thresholds of ACAT 








Changed from DOD Component to 




Removed Deputy Secretary of Defense 












changed "described in the core 
instruction" to "for such programs 
described in this instruction" 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
REQUIREMENTS. Table 10 provides the 
Information Requirements that replace or 
are in addition to the statutory or 
regulatory requirements in Tables 2 and 6 
in Enclosure 1 that are applicable to ACAT 
II and ACAT III programs. For rapid 
acquisition, the documentation 
procedures described in paragraph 
4a(3)(d) will be applied to all information 
requirements unless otherwise 
prescribed in statute. 
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APPENDIX B.  WARFIGHTER IMPROVISED/PROCURED 
URGENT NEEDS 
One inspired citizen saved the lives 
of six soldiers with this radio controlled 
truck equipped with a video camera made 
for a deployed brother. The soldiers used 
this modified toy hobby truck as a 
reconnaissance scout to look for IEDS 
ahead of their HMMWV. The remote car 
was eventually used to trigger a 500 pound 
IED potentially saving the soldiers’ lives. 
(Stump, 2015). This same truck design was 
also used to inspect the undercarriage of 
vehicles entering the facility for explosives.  
The design and equipment were readily 
available as COTS items. (Stump, 2015). 
Photo use permission from: SFC 




Improvised vehicle armor (hillbilly- 
armor) Soldiers rummaged salvage yards 
for scrap metal which was secured to their 
vehicles by the use of welds or bolts to 
provide additional protection from IEDs 
(Cerre, n.d.). Pictured is a five ton cargo 
truck modified with improvised armor on 
the doors, rear gunner’s box and an 
improved bumper (“Improvised Vehicle 
Armor,” 2015). Troops used scrap metal, 
pieces of Kevlar, plywood, blankets and 
comprised ballistic glass for protection 
(“Improvised Vehicle Armor,” 2015). User 
JKM on en.wikipedia - Photograph taken by 




Popular with the secret service and 
special forces, Dragon Skin Body Armor 
purchased by soldiers as additional 
protection from IEDs and bullets until some 
services banned the purchase of non-
standard gear  (Baglole, n.d.). Dragon 
armor is just one of many types of armor 
purchased by troops and their families. 
(“Soldiers in Iraq,” 2015). 
 
 
Follow below link for picture of dragon 
skin.  Permission was not available for this 
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